The War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720) was a conflict between Spain and the other major European powers over the balance of power in Italy. France and Britain jointly intervened on the side of the attacked party, Emperor Charles VI. In February 1720, the conflict was resolved when Philip V of Spain finally adhered to the Treaty of London (2 August 1718). The decision to go to war was contentious at the French court. For the benefit of public opinion, Philip, duke of Orléans and Regent of France, had to wage war against the Spanish Prime Minister, Cardinal Giulio Alberoni, rather than against the Sun King's grandson, Philip V. Moreover, whereas French and British diplomats found consensus as regards maintaining the principles of the Peace of Utrecht (11 April 1713), they remained commercial rivals. This article lifts a tip of the veil covering the complex trade relations during the conflict. Spain tried to placate and reassure French merchants, and conversely to punish their British counterparts. The British fleet patrolled the Mediterranean, searching French vessels as well as those of neutral states. The Emperor, though allied to France and Britain, could not prevent Neapolitan corsairs from preying on their trade. Moreover, French ships illegally furnished the Spanish army. Finally, France and Britain hoped to quell the abuse of neutral powers in the conflict (Tuscany, Genoa, Venice) by imposing upon them a duty to chase Spanish privateers from their harbours. The complaints of French traders, as indicated by the consuls to the Conseil de la Marine and the Regent himself at the apex of the French government, reveal pleas borne out of frustration, as well as appeals to either the law of nations or consular protection to shield merchants from assaults and abuses. When war was declared, inimical, friendly or allied relations in high politics seemed almost irrelevant. The military conflict generated uncertainty and damaged the reputation of the French flag. Diplomatic pressure on the neutral powers was seen as being more effective than reliance on seemingly corrupt or biased local jurisdictions. The Regent's management of the conflict -in close collaboration with Britain, despite all the difficulties on the ground -is all the more remarkable.
was at the heart of these agreements of 1713-1714. Yet, inevitably, economic and trade disputes followed as a corollary. 5 The territorial balance of power in Europe, established in 1713, was predicated on a commercial balance of trade on a global scale. 6 Subsequently, trade issues occupied a secondary place in the diplomatic management of the system. Incidents between British and French subjects overseas were not allowed to escalate into a rupture of political relations and were generally settled through normal diplomatic channels. Numerous reported incidents could have given rise to a conflict between Britain and France, but these were not allowed to poison the Franco-British rapport. 7 In the years between 1716 and 1718, peace negotiations amending the treaties of Utrecht had priority over commercial quarrels.
In reality, the commercial balance established at Utrecht seemed to be honoured more in the breach than in the observance. 9 The present article examines the case of the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720), whereby France and Britain intervened on the side of the Emperor against perceived Spanish aggression in Italy. 10 This conflict discredits the idea of a 'Second Hundred Years' War' between France and Britain from 1688 to 1815. The French Regent, Philip of Orléans (nephew of Louis XIV), went to war against Louis' own grandson, in alliance with a Protestant Maritime Power. All long-term economic, cultural and strategic interests seemed to pit Versailles and Hampton Court against one another. Yet the execution of the Treaty of Utrecht was a personal priority for both the Regent and George I, whose legitimacy was challenged by the Jacobite cause of the exiled 'King James III', James Francis Edward Stuart.
This article argues in the first instance that the impact of military operations and diplomatic alliances on Mediterranean trade was only superficial, and that Franco-British commercial rivalry was firmly entrenched. French merchants and consuls' complaints read as if the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713, which saw France and Spain pitted against the Maritime Powers and the Habsburg Monarchy) was still in train. 11 The following complaint from the aldermen and deputies negotiations on Italy are in at present will further prolong the resolutions we had hoped for a long time.' Similar complaints on the breach of the dispositions in the Franco-English 1715 -1719 (unpublished doctoral thesis, Pompeu Fabra University, 2016 .
11 See: Admiral Jennings' complaints of French depredations in the Mediterranean, coupled with the disrespect of neutrality by states such as the Grand Duchy of for commerce of Marseille illustrates the underlying tensions between French and British commercial interests, at a time when the Regent and George I combined to advance a common geopolitical goal. British private merchants and warships alike stopped and searched allied vessels:
The English actually have an overt trade in all ports of Spain […] they bring in all kinds of manufactured goods and food. Since the declaration of War [9 January 1719] [v] His Majesty's subjects have been forbidden access to these advantages […] their vessels pillaged and searched almost daily, and stopped by those belonging to the English nation without reverence or consideration for the French flag [pavilion] . 12 In spite of public declarations of war, or the theoretical primacy of a nation's self-preservation over advantages enjoyed by private individuals, the wartime suspension of trade was interpreted restrictively or avoided through indirect trade with neutrals. 13 Conversely, even between allies, trade remained a zero-sum game of fierce competition.
14 Partners in a common political undertaking were perceived to be as trustworthy as outside neutrals or enemies, 'exploiting every occasion to thwart and ruin commerce and navigation.' 15 According to Clairambault, French consul in Livorno, the reputation of the French nation as an intermediary for maritime transport was at stake -which he viewed as being more important than commercial damage to private owners. If British vessels were implicitly rendered safer, thereby profiting from the British military Tuscany. John S. Bromley, Corsairs and Navies (London: Hambledon Press, 1987) These general aggressive dynamics should not therefore reverse the intellectual order of priorities. Diplomats emphasised the need to preserve the balance of power first: individual merchants' complaints regarding violations of trade regulations ranked a poor second. Actions by the navy or consuls could only be undone by 'rigorous orders' from London or Paris. 'Respect for treaties and conventions' was subject to the outcome of diplomatic negotiations.
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The secondary aim of this article is to show how geopolitical Grand Strategy had repercussions for trade policy and the legal language used to frame it, and, conversely, how a discourse of interdependence and free trade was so evident that all parties used it indiscriminately. Seizures were regularly portrayed as being violations of the 'law of nations ' . 18 Yet individual claims were dependent on the political context, and primarily on the geopolitical changes brought about by the unusual situation of a Franco-British alliance. Treaty of Rastatt. The crown of Sicily was now in the possession of Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, again as a result of a Spanish concession. 20 Philip V claimed that ongoing negotiations between Turin and Vienna to hand Sicily over to the Emperor were a violation of the right of reversion, which he had retained on the occasion of the Spanish-Savoyard peace treaty. 21 In case the House of Savoy should leave Sicily, the island would revert to the crown of Spain. Yet none of this had been agreed or executed when Spanish troops landed on the island, which was poorly defended by Savoy. 22 Philip merely acted out of a desire to protect Spanish interests, since the reversion right on Sardinia was worth less than that of Sicily. 23 The island of Sardinia could act as a hub for a future invasion of Naples or Tuscany, and therefore was of considerable significance to the Spanish government.
INTRICATE CONFLICTS

24
Charles VI was at war with the Ottomans in the Balkans at the same time (1716-1718). Consequently, the Emperor had to appeal for external assistance to withstand this Spanish assault on his Sardinian possession. France and Britain were willing to offer this. However, they were not prepared to inflict sanctions on Spain. Philip V and Elisabetta Farnese, along with Cardinal Alberoni, had astutely invoked Italian frustration at Imperial encroachments on princely liberties. 25 39 Ordinance of Louis XV enjoining his subjects in Spain to come back to France immediately after publication, yet granting a delay of six months to all French merchants presently in Spain to stay there for six more months, in order to withdraw, sell or transport their goods and properties, Paris, 10 January 1719; Ordinance of Louis XV permitting Spanish subjects to stay in France for six months, advantageous to grant amnesty to disobedient subjects. 40 Finally, from a French perspective, the Emperor could not be allowed to become too powerful. The peace settlements of 1713-1714 aimed to establish and to preserve an equitable repartition of territories in Europe between the two main rival houses: those of Habsburg and Bourbon. 41 France and Britain acted as mediators between Charles VI and Philip V.
42 Neither Philip or Charles had accepted the idea of a partition of the Spanish composite monarchy. Accordingly, they demanded a general conference to conclude a final peace treaty between them and to implement all the terms of the multilateral agreement concluded in London on 2 August 1718 N.S., known as the 'Quadruple Alliance'.
43
During the military operations, trade in the Mediterranean was a point of significant interest. Firstly, although Italy had long been an object of external powers' political appetites, and was 'covered with foreign troops', this did not imply that the peninsula had fallen into economic oblivion. 44 As Pietro Tosini's 1718 pamphlet -defending Italy's liberties against ungrateful and avaricious neighbouring peoples -put it, 'Barbarous Nations have not been humanised but through the Italian trade', spreading 'arts, sciences and the most considerable advantages' in order to sell or transport their belongings, Paris, 10 January 1719; Ordinance of Louis XV permitting his subjects to travel to collect their properties and goods in Spain, to bring them back to the Kingdom within six months from 10 January, Paris, 6 Review, 15 (1962), 285-303 (pp. 287-88, 293, 301-03 Courts and tribunals could determine the legality of seizures effected in national ports. 77 Neutral vessels were not immune from searches. 'Free ship, free goods' could only be a prudent wish. 78 Trade politics in terms of the customs established by reciprocity seemed impossible between strong and weaker parties. 79 Conventional or doctrinal definitions of contraband were vague, privileges precarious, and the perpetual object of a political rapport de force. References to general principles served to encourage the Regent to take diplomatic action, rather than to place his trust in judicial institutions controlled by another power. De la Leurie's description of an incident in December 1718, before the French declaration of war, is telling: […] The Archives Nationales in Paris contain numerous complaints of private merchants concerning brigandage in the Mediterranean. Perhaps surprisingly, Italian privateering posed a more significant threat than was the case for Spain, a belligerent. The Kingdom of Naples -under the sovereignty of Charles VI, an ally of France and Britain -was described as the most dangerous nest of corsairs. The Austrian Habsburg dynasty had controlled Naples since Joseph I's troops had driven out the Spanish forces of Philip V in 1707. Wirich Philipp, Count of Daun (1669-1741) acted as its governor. The Kingdom did not return to Spanish hands until 1733-1734. 92 Privateering activities could of course be explained by the ongoing Austro-Ottoman war, which lasted until the peace of Passarowitz (21 July 1718). 93 To the extent whereby French vessels were transporting Turks, or goods for trading in the Levant, Charles VI's corsairs could intercept part of the Ottoman army's logistical support. a letter to Philip V), but was caught in bad weather and had to divert to Cape Passaro, where the British man o' war The Grafton intercepted her. The crew and captain were released and given back their belongings and money in Naples. 90 Ordinance by Louis XV, executing those of his predecessor issued on 7 January 1689 and 5 April 1713, forbidding all subjects resident in the Levant, Barbary and the ports of Italy, to embark goods on alien vessels not sailing under the French flag, Paris, 10 July 1719. However, in many cases the Neapolitan privateers acted outside any legal framework, often to 'pillage the most valuable goods' from passing vessels, 94 or to unjustly retain the Sultan's subjects after peace had been concluded, 'against all laws of nations'. 95 In the case of the ship-owner Moret, who had been captured by the Neapolitan corsair Palombo, the French resident in Livorno complained that the latter had searched the vessel and confiscated part of the cargo 'without the slightest pretext'. Palombo conducted the vessel to Civitavecchia in the Papal States, but neither Pope Clement XI (embroiled with Spain) nor his officers manifested impartiality. 96 In another incident, the French merchant Magnan sailed from Calabria to Naples on behalf of Genoese clients, but was caught by a Neapolitan privateer who argued that his cargo was to be declared 'de bonne prise' on the basis of Spanish cargo bills for an earlier voyage to Tenerife. The Tartanne, a vessel owned by the French privateer Martinenq, was seized by a Neapolitan corsair and released again, save for part of its cargo supposedly destined for Spain as contraband. 97 The goods were subsequently sold off to British tradesmen, in violation of the Quadruple Alliance between the Emperor, France and Britain.
98
As the Emperor was able to withdraw his troops from the Balkans in order to face the Spaniards in Sicily, Daun ordered the confiscation of any vessel capable of transporting troops, including those armed by subjects of allied powers, such as France. 99 France and Austria agreed on mutual regulations concerning seizures, rendering the latter merely conservatory in case of doubt. 100 A French vessel containing 600 barrels of powder was captured by a Neapolitan corsair off Corsica. Its listed destination was Malta. The case was solved by the Emperor's envoy Maricon in Genoa. He agreed in principle to release the French vessel. Yet, while the ammunition and the bills of cargo were being verified in Genoa, the French captain had to sail to Naples in order to transport troops for Daun.
Neapolitan seizures were transferred to Jean Baptiste du Bourg (1690-1728), the French resident in Vienna, who presented these cases to the Imperial court.
101 Unfortunately, Emperor Charles VI in turn referred all such cases to the Spanish Council, which was packed with his personal creatures, 102 in a manner reminiscent of his brief reign in Spain: 'The Neapolitans are des gens ramassez, who cannot be restrained by any rule of law, yet they are protected by these people, who will never let them give back what they have taken.'
103 At the peak of British depredations, Admiral Byng's practices were seen as inspiration for the disorderly behaviour of Neapolitan corsairs! 104 On one occasion in 1719, corsairs from Naples seized a Spanish ship carrying diplomatic correspondence from Venice and handed it over to the British fleet off the coast of Sicily, in order to get their share of the sale.
105 Whoever came across their path was a possible target. The protection of the corsair Palombo was more effective than the Neapolitan or Imperial court's desire for justice. French consuls repeatedly insisted that the Neapolitan magistrates took a personal interest in every privateering commission they delivered.
106 One of the detainees died 'a death of misery'. Palombo's protectors, as de la Leurie insinuated, had received their share of his bounty. vessel, as well as compensation for the harm inflicted by a Neapolitan corsair, by sentence of the Royal Chamber of Naples. 108 Outside these intricate networks of reported Neapolitan corruption, Imperial envoys tried to bring their unruly subjects to reason, e.g. enjoining them to appear before local judges in Genoa, 109 or offering compensation to wronged merchants for damage caused by Italian privateers.
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In Spain's case, the use of private agents to protect the colonial empire is a familiar topic to economic and political historians.
111 Lacking the top-down military means to exclude foreign merchants, private help could fill the gaps.
112 Disregarding their nationality, even British subjects were reported to have served as privateers for Philip V, thereby damaging the trade of their own compatriots. 113 Meanwhile, building up a stronger centralised system of government, while embracing mercantilism and protectionist policies, would allow the Spanish crown to better exploit its commercial assets.
114 During an armed conflict, the ranks of Spanish privateers could be reinforced by private persons, subjects of the Kings of France or Britain, or of the Emperor. The presence of corruption in political affairs was not exceptional in the early modern period, where private and public interest were often insufficiently distinguished, see: Aaron Graham, Corruption, Party, and Government in Britain, 1702 -1713 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015 ; Peter R. Campbell, Power and Politics in Old Regime France, 1720 -1745 (London: Routledge, 1996 ; Niels Grüne and Simona Slanička, eds, Korruption: Historische Annäherungen an eine Grundfigur politischer Kommunikation (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010 These search operations were evidently hotly disputed, as were those of the British concerning the transport of Spanish contraband on French vessels in the War of the Quadruple Alliance. 116 The Anglo-French Treaty on Trade and Commerce concluded in Utrecht (but never ratified for the core articles) 117 contained an article limiting mutual searches to those carried out in pursuit of strict contraband. 118 The British fleet, however, did not respect this when patrolling the Mediterranean. The British consul in Livorno even declared the Treaty of Commerce 'ridiculous '. 119 No 'free ships, free goods' principle was applicable to French vessels.
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Even carriages of salted meat, 'goods declared free under the Treaty of Utrecht', 121 destined for Malta were stopped and seized, under suspicion of being destined for Spanish-occupied Sicily. 122 In one specific case, the English captain and consul in Livorno blackmailed the French owner, asking for 200 pistoles before he would release the vessel. The crew were molested, kicked, and assaulted with lashes and swords.
Some practical influence on local case law could be useful, as stated by the Council of Commerce in the case of Naples:
[…] no expenditure is more useful for the navigation of His Majesty's subjects than the annual gratification of 150 piastres paid to the judge responsible for adjudicating the seizures of the French nation, who always ranks among the most prominent ministers of the Country [Naples] […] with the necessary credit and authority to protect and give justice to the French and maintain them in their privileges. 123 crimes (Clairambault, 12 May 1719, o.c., fol. 137 r ). Yet, he managed to escape with 'une femme de mauvaise vie' (Clairambault, 9 June 1719, o.c., fol. 149 v Alimento, . 121 Clairambault, Livorno, 21 The inspiration came from an earlier proposal directed at the neutral Dutch Republic, drafted in November 1718, three months after the battle of Cape Passaro. 126 Materially, the clauses pertained to domestic law. The treaty proposal amounted to a French imposition of legislation on the small neutral Italian states, but was of prime importance to safeguard Mediterranean trade.
127 Its first article established free entrance to ports for any vessel, either warships or merchants, including those belonging to privateers, armed for war with commissions from their sovereign. However, the second article forbade the arming of vessels for war. Those who contravened these requirements had to be prevented from sailing by having their ships confiscated. Article three ordered all seizures by privateers to leave the relevant port within twenty-four hours and forbade their sale. A longer stay entailed the loss of the ship in question, the release of its crew, and the impossibility of the privateer's enforcing any further claim. This operation was similar to what had been agreed previously, during the War of the Spanish Succession, with the King of Denmark (who was neutral at the start of the war).
128 The twenty-four 124 Convention project between Britain, France, Austria, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Republics of Venice and Genoa, to maintain neutrality in the ports of their dominance and to avoid piracy, Paris, s.d., NA, SP, 78, 164,  The problems encountered by French merchants were characterised as the exercise of 'criminal activities and piracy' by 'private persons, subject either to the allied Powers or the King of Spain', in order to enrich themselves in an unjust way, 'with avaricious intentions', without 'the permission to privateer on the basis of legitimate commissions issued by their sovereigns' (art. V.). Captains entering the ports of Genoa, Venice or the Grand Duchy of Tuscany would have had to submit themselves to compulsory verification by the local magistrates, as well as the consuls of the 'respective powers having an interest in the case'. In view of the incessant trouble described above, the text also aimed at the privateers as well as at the distribution of power between local jurisdictions and foreign consuls.
The Italian neutrals were equipped with their own jurisdictions, able to exercise judicial control over seizures.
130 Their neutrality implied equal treatment for all belligerents. However, this concept was hard to sustain in view of the imbalance of power between the coalition and the King of Spain.
131 Aubert, consul in Genoa, wrote an extensive memorandum on consular jurisdiction. He stated that Genoese maritime magistrates infringed upon French consular jurisdiction (governed by Colbert's 1681 ordinance), insofar as vessels or individuals from the French nation were concerned. Consular decisions were only enforceable after a Genoese notary declared them conformable to the laws and statutes of the Genoese Republic. That said, Aubert complained of excessive encroachments by the local judges, who treated cases on their merits. Another example is 129 Schnakenbourg, p. 7 132 Venice had to grant an exception to the Emperor, confirming his subjects' rights, and also allow French and British vessels to come and go without an official visit of inspection.
133
Reports by French consuls on the peninsula alerted the Regent to the necessity of imposing clearer rules, even if this meant intrusion into domestic legislation. French consuls had jurisdiction over their own nationals, a privilege which they jealously guarded. For instance, the Regent issued an ordinance forbidding the Sossins merchant family to execute a local judicial decision obtained from municipal judges in Livorno against a certain Chavignon, another French merchant from Marseille.
134 Disputes between French merchants, or any disputes whereby a French merchant acted as the defendant or debtor in a trial, were under the French consul's exclusive jurisdiction. Even several years of residence abroad could not change this reality. Appeals could only be heard before the (French) sovereign court of parliament closest to the foreign port, namely that of Provence:
On the basis of the law of nations, His Majesty has never conceived of nor tolerated any situation whereby disputes between his subjects would be dependent on other judges than those who give justice in his name, and under his authority. refused to adhere to the terms of this convention. 144 As explained above, corsairs from Naples were among the most persistent threats to French commerce. If one of the three pillars of the alliance -namely the Emperor -would not take part, it was useless to attempt to impose the articles on Italian neutrals. EPILOGUE: THE ULTIMATE RECOURSE TO NATURAL LAW As French and British merchants alike voiced their anger at the commercial damage they had to suffer, the fundamental nature of free navigation between nations was at the heart of their argument. 145 Falling back on the general law of nations as an avenue of complaint was not unique. During the conflict, France and Britain were frustrated with Dutch aloofness from the struggle for what they defined as being the common good of Europe. Hispano-Dutch trade continued unhampered during the War of the Quadruple Alliance, whereas France and Britain lost part of their market. In line with general Dutch attitudes to neutrality, the States-General preferred to be medius in bello, or non hostes.
146 This meant that they preferred to gain in financial terms from the principles of free trade, rather than prioritising ruinous spending on their defence, as had been the case in the War of the Spanish Succession. 147 This search for what one might describe as a temporary commercial advantage effectively removed the Dutch Republic from the 'top negotiations during the conflict. Moreover, the freedom of commerce claimed by the Dutch in the War of the Quadruple Alliance contrasted with their own attitude three years later. In 1722, Emperor Charles VI granted an official patent to the Imperial East Indies Company in Ostend, one of the most important ports in the Austrian Netherlands. However, Britain and the Dutch Republic jointly moved to curb the potential success of their commercial competitor. The formal legal basis for the Company's elimination was the violation of the Treaty of Munster, at the occasion of which Philip IV of Spain had denied access to the parts of the Indies controlled by the Dutch to his 'Castilian' subjects.
The treaty of Munster's validity was connected to inherent limitations on the principle of free navigation on the high seas, as Hugo Grotius had expounded in his famous Mare Liberum. 148 Most of the literature follows the Dutch thesis, supported by such influential names as Jean Barbeyrac, professor of public law in Groningen. Unfortunately, various pamphlets written against this commercial restrictiveness have been forgotten. 149 However, one of these writings, attributed to the Imperial historiographer Jean du Mont de Carels-Kroon, 150 who drafted the commercial treaty allowing the Ostend Company to trade directly in Spain, fundamentally undermined the Dutch point of view. 151 What if the new King of Spain, Philip V, were to open his overseas dominions to Charles VI's subjects? Would not this new treaty lift the limitation installed in 1648 by his predecessor Philip IV? Just as in the case of Mediterranean trade, the inherent logic of geopolitical realities settled the affair. However, the flexibility of universal discourse on free trade as a natural right between sovereigns could not be eradicated. The Dutch Republic shifted from a militant position in the early seventeenth century, against the Hispano-Portuguese division of the world into two hemispheres at the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 and also against the British opinion of Mare Clausum, propagated by John Selden, 152 to one of self-serving repression, and consolidation of its own position. 153 Even if the Dutch abandoned this point of view in order to eliminate a competitor, the validity of Grotius' initial affirmation remained. The Dutch scholar had referred to the freedom to trade and navigate, as enlarged upon in Justinian's Digest. In view of the lack of broader ratification of the Franco-British trade treaty, this would remain the bedrock of merchants' legal defence, at any time when their vessels had been 'arrested against the law of nations and contrary to the treaties concluded between France and England'. 154 
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